Fred Kaplan is a New York City based writer and author who has been a vocal critic of the Bush administration and its foreign policy. Unfortunately, his rote and partisan attacks have often obscured his valid critiques of U.S. military shortcomings. Kaplan writes in Slate.com the U.S. Army has finally rectified an unjust and unwise personnel decision that has continued for too long.
Last November, when Gen. David Petraeus was named to chair the promotion board that picks the Army’s new one-star generals, the move was seen as, potentially, the first rumble of a seismic shift in the core of the military establishment.
Kaplan announces the signal event of the promotion to Brigadier General of Colonel H. R. McMaster, author of the 1998 bestseller, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.
In 2006 and again in 2007, the Army’s promotion board passed over Col. H.R. McMaster, widely regarded as one of the most creative strategists of this “new” (though actually quite ancient) style of warfare. In Iraq, he was commander of the unit that brought order to Tal Afar, using the classic counterinsurgency methods—”clear, hold, and build”—that Petraeus later adopted as policy. When I was reporting a story last summer about growing tensions between the Army’s junior and senior officer corps, more than a dozen lieutenants and captains complained bitterly (with no prompting from me) about McMaster’s rejection, seeing it as a sign that the top brass had no interest in rewarding excellent performance. The more creative captains took it as a cue to contemplate leaving the Army.
Kaplan also wrote last year about why the annual one-star general promotion list is considered so important by the Army specifically and is scrutinized across all branches of the military:
McMaster’s nonpromotion has not been widely reported, yet every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered its implications. One colonel, who asked not to be identified because he didn’t want to risk his own ambitions, said: “Everyone studies the brigadier-general promotion list like tarot cards — who makes it, who doesn’t. It communicates what qualities are valued and not valued.”
This is great news and is encouraging, most of all, considering many believed Robert Gates was chosen as a SecDef placeholder rather than a force for change when Bush plucked him from Texas A&M University. This article at HotAir.com is related and informative on this subject. It discusses a seminar McMaster gave in May of this year at the American Enterprise Institute.
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Nothing new here. The ebb and flow of old vs. new in the military has always been there. Billy Mitchell was a prime example. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the battleship admirals still held sway over the Navy. That is one of the things I liked about the Marine Corps. There was less resistance to changes in tactics and equipment (which was usually sorely limited by the shoe string budget constraints the Marine Corps was imposed to - and imposed upon itself.
There was an unofficial credo in the Marines: Ask for 100% of the funding you want, use 90% of what was given you, and do 110% of what you said you were going to do. This policy likely helped the Marine Corps survive though against the winds of many who wanted to eliminate it altogether - Truman being the worst.
Over the years many types of influences and prejudices have influenced the military. Often times if you were not a graduate of one of the service academies, colonel was as high as you were going to go. And if you were a former enlisted man, you would never be the head of that branch of service.
One of the best things the Army has done since this war began was to train like they fight. Proper training and continual attention to physical conditioning and maintenance of standards and equipment has vastly improved our Army and helped to reduce casualties - while causing real grief to the bad guys. Whatever happens at the top, you can at least see the dedication and initiative in the lower ranks. And with today’s information pipeline, people like Colonel McMaster can only be ignored for so long.
#1 Big45Iron
I have to gently disagree with you. I believe the promotion of one officer to general is not a major historical event, but the reconstituting of the selection process and of the board itself signals a very large change in organizational attitude. While our military history certainly reflects a constant tension between the old and new, the young and seasoned, the executive officer and the experienced combat veteran, there are identifiable times when there was a fundamental shift in character and mentality. I think this is one of those times and the Petraeus board signals larger things to come.
I don’t disagree with you at all Texpat. But watch what happens after the war is over and public pressure for change is off. We saw this happen right after WW2, when the Army got complacent again about training. When Korea rolled around they were woefully unprepared, and took a tremendous amount of casaulties for it. The vigorous Army of the early 40s had become complacent and entrenched again.
FYI, usually the executive officer is an experienced combat leader. He’s pulled as the best combat platoon commander in the company - normally because either the XO was killed, or the CO was killed and the old XO moved up.
#3 Big
You’re correct about the executive officers. I should have specifically stated XOs from non-combat sectors of the Army. There have been numerous ones promoted in recent years over officers with more intense and current combat experience.
Texpat, depends on the type of command they’re assigned to, and their level of training. There are just so many facets. There is another old axiom: Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics. Tactics are good, but you have to get your warrior there with the most bullets, bandages and beans. The more men and materials you can get to the objective, and supporting artillery, air, and logistics, and the faster you can get it there, the more likely you are to win the battle with the least amount of pain. A good tactical commander at the battalion and lower level might not be the best guy at the brigade of division level. I can’t speak for the Army, but the Marines were pretty good about rotating their officers in and out of combat and staff billets to ensure they were well trained and cognizant of how the various pieces fit in the puzzle. Professional education is often times the key.
Here’s a good example. My old XO at Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment is now a major general. Look at his career.
#5 b45
Pretty impressive list of accomplishments. He’s about to run out of room for decorations.
Wagon, when then lstLt Regner was the XO of Kilo 3/8, this guy was our battalion operations officer, and this guy was our battalion commander.